
# Privacy Odometers and Filters: Pay-as-you-Go Composition







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## Differential Privacy [DMNS]

Note that  $A: \mathcal{X}^n \to \mathcal{O}$  should a roughly stay the same if one person's data changes.




For all neighboring x, x' and outcomes  $O \subseteq \mathcal{O}$ ,

$$\mathbb{P}\left[A(x) \in O\right] \leq e^{\epsilon} \mathbb{P}\left[A(x') \in O\right] + \delta$$

- ightharpoonup Parameter  $\epsilon > 0$  measures the *privacy loss*.
- Parameter  $\delta > 0$  is the *failure probability* where the privacy loss can be much larger than  $\epsilon$ .

## Composition Theorems - Prior Work



PRun algorithm  $A_i$  which is  $\epsilon_i$ -DP on the data  $\mathbf{x}$  as a function of the outcomes of previous algorithms  $A_1, \cdots, A_{i-1}$ . Then A is  $(\epsilon_g, \delta_g)$ -DP where  $f(\epsilon_1, \cdots, \epsilon_k) \leq \epsilon_g$  and


$$A(x) = A_k \circ \cdots \circ A_1(x).$$

- ▶ Basic Composition [DMNS]:  $f(\epsilon_1, \dots, \epsilon_k) = \sum \epsilon_i$ .
- Advanced Composition [DRV]: quadratic improvement for  $\delta_g > 0$ ,

 $f(\epsilon_1,\cdots,\epsilon_k) = \tilde{O}\left(\sqrt{\sum \epsilon_i^2}\right).$ 

► Optimal Composition [KOV, MV]: complex form.

## **Application: Adaptive Data Analysis**



# **Proposed Solution** [DFH<sup>+</sup>]:

- Limit information learned from x through A(x) $\implies A(x)$  and x are "close" to independent.
- ► One way to limit info is to have analysis be *DP*

## Our Focus: Adaptive Privacy Parameters


- As the analyst determines what (and how many) analyses to run he will want to allocate his privacy budget adaptively.
- These composition theorems crucially rely on the choice of parameters  $\epsilon_i$  and the number of algorithms k to be fixed up front.



- ► Which composition theorems still apply when we can select the parameters *adaptively*?
- How can we even define differential privacy in this adaptively parameter setting?

### Privacy Loss and the Analyst

The privacy loss for algorithm  $A: \mathcal{X}^n \to \mathcal{O}$  on neighboring x, x' for outcome  $o \in \mathcal{O}$ 





- Privacy loss random variable L(o) where  $o \sim A(x)$ .
- ightharpoonup The analyst  ${\cal A}$  fixes a prob of failure  $\delta_g$  beforehand.
- ▶  $\mathcal{A}$  selects  $\epsilon_i \geq 0$  and  $A_i$ , which is  $\epsilon_i$ -DP, as a function of previous outcomes in an adversarial way to try to make the privacy loss large.


#### **Privacy Odometer**

Privacy odometer provides a running upper bound on privacy loss.




A valid privacy odometer is a function  $\mathrm{COMP}_{\delta_g}: \mathbb{R}^* \to \mathbb{R}$  where for any analyst  $\mathcal{A}$  who selects  $\epsilon_1, \cdots, \epsilon_k$  adaptively, then w.p.  $\geq 1 - \delta_g$ ,

$$L(o_1, \cdots, o_k) < \text{COMP}_{\delta_{\sigma}}(\epsilon_1, \cdots, \epsilon_k)$$



#### **Privacy Filter**



Privacy filter is a stopping rule, so w.h.p. a given privacy budget  $\epsilon_g$  will not be exceeded.



- ► A valid privacy filter  $COMP_{\epsilon_g,\delta_g}: \mathbb{R}^k \to \{HALT,CONT\}$  where for any analyst  $\mathcal{A}$  who selects  $\epsilon_1,\cdots,\epsilon_k$  adaptively, then w.p.  $> \mathbf{1} \delta_g$ , we have  $L < \epsilon_g$  and  $COMP_{\epsilon_g,\delta_g}(\epsilon_1,\cdots,\epsilon_k) = HALT$
- lacktriangle The mechanism that stops before HALT is  $(\epsilon_g, \delta_g)$ -DP

### Main Results

- ► Basic composition still applies in adaptive setting.
- A valid privacy filter is the following  $COMP_{\epsilon_g,\delta_g}$  ( $\epsilon_1,\cdots,\epsilon_k$ ) = CONT if

$$\tilde{O}\left(\sqrt{\left(\epsilon_g^2 + \sum \epsilon_i^2\right)}\right) < \epsilon_g$$

and otherwise  $\widehat{\text{COMP}}_{\epsilon_g,\delta_g}(\epsilon_1,\cdots,\epsilon_k) = \text{HALT}$ .

► A valid privacy odometer is

$$\text{COMP}_{\delta_g}\left(\epsilon_1,\cdots,\epsilon_k\right) = \tilde{O}\left(\sqrt{\sum \epsilon_i^2 \log \log(n)}\right)$$

as long as  $\sum \epsilon_i^2 > 1/n^2$ .

There is a provable gap between privacy filters and odometers – there is *no* valid privacy odometer where

$$ext{COMP}_{\delta_g}\left(\epsilon_1,\cdots,\epsilon_k
ight)$$
 is  $ilde{o}\left(\sqrt{\sum\epsilon_i^2\log\log(n)}
ight)$  .

#### Key to Proofs

- The advanced composition theorem used *martingale* concentration inequalities, like Azuma's inequality, but they no longer apply when the bounds are random.
- ► We then apply concentration bounds from *self* normalizing processes [PnKLL].

#### References

[DFH<sup>+</sup>] C. Dwork, V. Feldman, M. Hardt, T. Pitassi, O. Reingold, and A. Roth. In *NIPS'15*.

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